Selected Published Articles
“Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement of Bad Social Norms” (with Klaus Abbink, Lata Gangadharan, and Toby Handfield) Nature Communications (2017)
Abstract Social norms are an important element in explaining how humans achieve very high levels of cooperative activity. It is widely observed that, when norms can be enforced by peer punishment, groups are able to resolve social dilemmas in prosocial, cooperative ways. Here we show that punishment can also encourage participation in destructive behaviours that are harmful to group welfare, and that this phenomenon is mediated by a social norm. In a variation of a public goods game, in which the return to investment is negative for both group and individual, we find that the opportunity to punish led to higher levels of contribution, thereby harming collective payoffs. A second experiment confirmed that, independently of whether punishment is available, a majority of subjects regard the efficient behaviour of non-contribution as socially inappropriate. The results show that simply providing a punishment opportunity does not guarantee that punishment will be used for socially beneficial ends, because the social norms that influence punishment behaviour may themselves be destructive.
“Political Stability in the Open Society” (with Kevin Vallier) American Journal of Political Science (In Press, 2017)
Abstract We argue that the Rawlsian description of a just liberal society, the well-ordered society, fails to accommodate deep disagreement and is insufficiently dynamic. In response, we formulate an alternative model that we call the open society, organized around a new account of dynamic stability. In the open society, constitutional rules must be stable enough to preserve social conditions that foster experimentation, while leaving room in legal and institutional rules for innovation and change. Systemic robustness and dynamic stability become important for the open society in a way that they are not in the well-ordered society. This model of the open society and the corresponding model of stability has interesting implications for thinking about the goals, norms, and institutions of liberal political systems.
“Evaluating Bad Norms” Social Philosophy & Policy, (Forthcoming, 2018)
Abstract: Some norms are bad. Norms of revenge, female genital mutilation, honor killings, and other norms strike us as destructive, cruel, and wasteful. The puzzle is why so many people see these norms as authoritative and why these norms often resist change. To answer these questions, we need to look at what “bad” norms are and how we can evaluate them. Here I develop and integrative analysis of norms that aims to avoid parochialism in norm evaluation. After looking and rejecting several evaluative standards, I propose what I call a comparative-functional analysis of norms that is both operationalizable/testable and non-parochial that can sort better and worse norms. One conclusion of this approach is that norms are not so much “bad” and “good” as “better” and “worse.” This approach should be of interest to theorists and practitioners alike.
“Constructivism, Representation, and Diversity: Path-Dependence in Public Reason Theories of Justice” Synthese (In Press, 2017)
Abstract Public reason theories are characterized by three conditions: constructivism, representation, and stability. Constructivism holds that justification does not rely on any antecedent moral or political values outside of the procedure of agreement. Representation holds that the reasons for the choice in the model must be rationally explicable to real agents outside the model. Stability holds that the principles chosen in the procedure should be stable upon reflection, especially in the face of diversity in a pluralistic society. Choice procedures that involve at least two-stages with different information, as Rawls’s theory does, will be path-dependent and not meet the condition of representation since it will not be globally coherent. Attempts to solve this problem without eliminating the segmentation of choice in the procedure will run afoul of constructivism or stability. This problem is instructive because it highlights how public reason theories must evolve in the face of increased concerns about diversity.
“On the Calculus of Consent,” with Gerald Gaus, The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Contemporary Political Theory, edited by Jacob Levy, Oxford University Press ( 2017)
“The Ethics of Legislative Vote Trading” Political Studies 64, no.3 (2016): 614-629
Abstract: This paper argues that legislative vote trading by representatives is both ethically permissible and may be ethically required in many cases. This conclusion is an implication of a thin, general account of representation that requires representatives to vote on the basis of the perceived preferences or interest of their constituents. These special duties arise from a thin account of representation and create a weak, defeasible duty for representatives to engage in what they believe will be beneficial vote trades. After establishing this claim, I consider two objections to this duty. One based on equating legislative vote trading with corruption, the other arguing that logrolling violates the “duty of civility.” This paper argues that neither objection undermines the main claim that there is a weak duty to engage in logrolling. Nevertheless, the implications of this duty may be troubling for other reasons.
“The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Stability, and Diversity,”with Kevin Vallier The European Journal of Philosophy 23, no.4 (2015): 933-954
Abstract: John Rawls’s transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was driven by his rejection of Theory’s account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is the idea of public reason. We see Rawls’s account of stability as an attempt to solve a mutual assurance problem. We maintain that Rawls’s solution fails because his primary assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public reason relies on a condition of consensus that we argue is both unrealistic in modern, pluralistic democracies and fragile. Rejecting his conception of public reason as unable to maintain stability, we offer an “indirect alternative” that we believe is much more robust. We offer experimental evidence to back up this claim.
“When Justice Demands Inequality,” with Keith Hankins, The Journal of Moral Philosophy 12, no.2 (2015): 172-194
Abstract: In Rescuing Justice and Equality G.A. Cohen argues that justice requires an uncompromising commitment to equality. Cohen also argues, however, that justice must be sensitive to other values, including a robust commitment to individual freedom and to the welfare of the community. We ask whether a commitment to these other values means that, despite Cohen’s commitment to equality, his own view requires that we make room for inequality in the name of justice? We argue that even on Cohen’s version of egalitarianism equality, freedom, and welfare are not always compatible. Justice will require trade-offs between these values. Sometimes, equality will need to be sacrificed. This is a surprising result and to show it, we use two informal impossibility proofs drawn from examples in Rescuing Justice and Equality
“Rational Choice and the Original Position: The (Many) Models of Rawls and Harsanyi,” with Gerald Gaus, The Original Position, edited by Timothy Hinton, Cambridge University Press (2015): 39-58.
Abstract: We argue that what defines the original position arguments of both John Harsanyi and John Rawls is the belief that the justification of principles of justice must be rational from the point of view of some specified set of choosers. We call this the Fundamental Derivation Thesis. For Rawls and Harsanyi, the original position is a model of rational choice, not a form of counter-factual justification or hypothetical consent. The original position is also not a moral epistemological heuristic that identifies true or justified principles. Instead, it is a model that links the rationality of individual choosers with a set of principles evaluated from the moral point of view.
“Bankers, Vampires, and Organ Sellers: Who Can You Trust?” with David Schmidtz, Commerce and Community: Ecologies of Social Cooperation, edited by Robert Garnett, Paul Lewis, and Lenore Ealy, Routledge (2015): 336-341.
”Adam Smith and the Social Contract” The Adam Smith Review, Volume 8 (2015): 195-216
Abstract: Adam Smith is, along with David Hume, typically understood as a critic of the social contract and a precursor to the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick. I argue that this interpretation misunderstands something fundamentally important about Smith’s distinctive approach to justice. Smith, I claim, should can be understood as a precursor to evolutionary approaches to the social contract. Further, reading Smith as a contractarian not only helps to bring out underappreciated deontological aspects of his account of account of justice, but also can help contemporary contract theorists solve several important problems.
“Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice,” Philosophical Studies 167, no. 3 (2014): 683-699.
Abstract: Contractarian theories of justice define justice as the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint on reasoning, however, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal of bargaining theories of justice.
“Ordering Anarchy,” Rationality, Markets and Morals (Special Topic: Can the Social Contract Be Signed by an Invisible Hand? Edited by Geoffrey Brennan and Bernd Lahno) 5, no. 1 (2014): 30-46.
Abstract: Ordered social life requires rules of conduct that help generate and preserve peaceful and cooperative interactions among individuals. The problem is that these social rules impose costs. They prohibit us from doing some things we might see as important and they require us to do other things that we might otherwise not do. The question for the contractarian is whether the costs of these social rules can be rationally justiﬁed. I argue that traditional contract theories have tended to underestimate the importance of evaluating the cost of enforcement and compliance in the contract procedure. In addition, the social contract has been understood narrowly as a method of justifying speciﬁcally moral or political rules. I defend a broader version of contractarianism as a justiﬁcatory model that can be used to evaluate any set of social rules or institutions that impose costs on agents. In so doing, I argue that contractarianism is a general method of evaluating and justifying the rules that order the structure of social life.
“Reconciling Justice and Pleasure in Epicurean Contractarianism,“ Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 16, no. 2 (2013): 423-436
Abstract: Epicurean contractarianism is an attempt to reconcile individualistic hedonism with a robust account of justice. The pursuit of pleasure and the requirements of justice, however, have seemed to be incompatible to many commentators, both ancient and modern. It is not clear how it is possible to reconcile hedonism with the demands of justice. Furthermore, it is not clear why, even if Epicurean contractarianism is possible, it would be necessary for Epicureans to endorse a social contract. I argue here that Epicurean contractarianism is both possible and necessary once we understand Epicurean practical rationality in a new way. We are left with an appealing version of teleological, individualistic contractarianism that is significantly different from Hobbesian contractarianism.
Abstract: Justice is a virtue that has a history. Over that history there are many different virtues that go by the name “justice.” Justice is a virtue of both persons and institutions. Ancient thinkers tended to overemphasize the personal aspect of justice, modern thinkers the institutional aspect. Both, however, are related and important. Justice as a virtue encourages cooperation and the toleration of diversity. Just people become reciprocators and comfortable with diversity. Just institutions and societies foster reciprocation through peaceful cooperation. Justice, in a pluralistic society, is a pluralistic virtue.
“Social Evolution,” with Gerald Gaus, The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy, edited by Gerald Gaus and Fred D’Agostino, Routledge (2012)
Abstract: An overview of different approaches to understanding social evolution. We begin by looking at early theories of social evolution from Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. We then look at the debate in the 19th century between those who saw social evolution as cooperative versus those who saw it as a competitive process. When then look at the important pioneering work on social evolution by F.A. Hayek before examining more recent developments in modeling social evolution with evolutionary game-theory and gene-culture co-evolution.
“Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract,” with Gerald Gaus and Fred D’Agostino, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017)
Review of “John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness,” Public Choice 159:1-2 (2014), pp. 309-311 (2014)
Review of “Charles Tilly, Credit and Blame,” (with David Schmidtz)
The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 18:7 (2013), pp. 967.
Review of “The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Social Sciences,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 45(1): 85-90 (2009)